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Introduction 
This paper explores the US ‘off-year’ 2017 election results, with a particular focus on 
Virginia, although our analysis also considers results from other States and races, such as 
New Jersey, New York, and Washington State.  Specifically, we address a number of 
questions, such as  whether the achievements of the Democratic Party are a reaction caused 
by ‘Trumpism’ and the emergence of an ‘anti-Trump’ movement, or whether  we are looking 
at the renaissance of the democratic-socialist left in the US, as a component of the 
Democratic Party. Finally, it may well be the case that either of such aspects are slightly 
over-stated or emphasised, and that, instead, we are witnessing the continued trajectory of: a 
Democratic voting coalition that emerged during the 1960s; the tri-partite voting bloc of 
women, younger voters, and African-American, Hispanic and other minority Americans.   
Our paper uses a mixed method approach, employing secondary analysis of existing 
quantitative results from such contests as the Virginia House of Delegates 2017 elections, 
combined with qualitative analysis and predictions of current and potential future candidate 
and party behaviour. Such predictions, based on analysis of turnouts and voting behaviour in 
2016 through 2018 (and associated opinion polling) are undertaken for the purpose of 
considering the nature of the circumstances indicating a potentially significant resurgence in 
Democratic Party fortunes at the national level. 
We begin with an analysis of voter turnout and behaviour in off-year and special elections 
since November 2016; particularly in Virginia. This leads to the focus and question of our 
research: are the campaigns of Republican candidates helped or hindered by the Trumpist 
agenda and/or President Trump’s specifically stated goals? Has Trump caused a seismic shift 
in voting behaviour, or simply re-ignited a voting pattern that has already been attributed to 
previous Democratic victories? The paper goes on to consider the potential implications of 
the raft of Republican retirements, particularly from the US House of Representatives. Also 
discussed are the opportunities open to the Democratic Party in this potentially new or 
resurgent reality. Finally, we will discuss the chances of Democratic Party success in the 
2018 November congressional midterms and will briefly comment on the prospects for the 
2020 presidential race. For now we begin with a look at recent off-year elections. 
First we issue a note of caution. Any analysis of the results of off-year special elections and 
in some ways, the congressional midterms, needs to be approached with restraint. 
Traditionally, such contests are characterised by low turnout and a swing away from the 
incumbent president’s party. However, a recurring theme of this paper, as well as 
contemporary media accounts is the question of whether or not we are living in traditional 
electoral times. Is this a new Trumpian reality, or are we witnessing a ‘back to the future’ 
form of behavior? 
On to Virginia  
Nothing illustrates the core question of the political reality of America today better than the 
November 2017 results in Virginia, and also the New Jersey gubernatorial race (not to 
mention a variety of results in State and Federal elections in diverse parts of the nation. As 
CNN reported: 
Republican candidates were swamped - particularly in the suburbs - by Democrats 
thanks, in large part, to President Donald Trump's dismal poll numbers. Democrats 
turned out in large numbers to send a message to Trump while Republicans, broadly 
speaking, were less enthused to go vote (Cillizza, 2017) 
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This follows a media narrative that seems to indicate voting results in Virginia and other 
places were a purely partisan test on Trump Republicanism. The New York Times, quoting 
unnamed election analysts, stated that the 100 races for the Virginia House represented, ‘the 
purest test of grass-roots anger at the president’. And argued that, because voters knew little 
about individual candidates, and that advertising, especially on TV, was often minimal, the 
races would become ‘a generic partisan ballot’.  
It is certainly the conventional wisdom that the party of the White House resident tends to 
suffer losses in mid-term Federal elections, and state elections during the same period.  This 
can be witnessed within contemporary political science literature, for example, Jacobsen 
states that, ‘party fortunes in midterm elections are broadly shaped by three basic factors: the 
number of seats the president's party already holds;  how well the economy is performing and 
how the public views the president's performance in office’ (Jacobson, 2007) 
It is agreed that such factors have previously been accurate predictors of midterm swings. 
Certainly the Obama years saw the Democrats lose a significant number of seats within 
several States, not to mention a loss of gubernatorial control across America (Malone, 2017). 
This was not a new pattern as since 1938 the incumbent president’s party has lost House seats 
in the midterms on every occasion except two. In 1998 during the Gingrich inspired polarity, 
Clinton’s Democrats gained five seats. In 2002, perhaps aided by a post 9/11 bounce, Bush’s 
GOP gained eight.  In the same period any incumbency has only ever resulted in a swing of, 
at most, two senate seats. We are unconvinced the Trump’s GOP will buck the usual trend. 
However, the question remains, what will be the root causes of that continued trend?  
Another key to party success, and possibly a cause of voter engagement, is that for most of 
the 20
th
 Century the US Congress operated on a much greater bipartisan basis. While the 
Democrats controlled the Presidency For example, in 1938 and 1963) their own legislators 
provided checks on Roosevelt’ attempts to influence specific policies and Kennedy’s drive on 
Civil Rights, respectively. As Fortier points out, 
For much of the twentieth century, the two political parties looked quite different 
from the way they do today. Each party contained within it a significant amount of 
ideological diversity, and the two parties’ ideological leanings overlapped in 
important ways (Fortier, 2015: 53) 
Political scientists have focused and emphasised discussion about increases in polarisation 
and the effect on voting patterns. One contested view is presented by Rogowski, who states 
‘When the level of conflict increases between elites, voters respond by increasing their 
support of the candidate who shares their partisan or ideological identity’ (Rogowski, 2016: 
20).  This may be so but historically it is the presidency which shapes the midterms as Busch 
points out, 
The president's party consistently loses seats because it consistently suffers a fall-off 
of approximately 5 percent in its national vote share in midterm elections. Indeed, 
from 1894 through 1994, the two-party vote share of the president's party in 
congressional elections fell in every election except that of 1926 9Busch, 1999: 16) 
 
On top of this, the decline in the power of party elites and the weakening of party identity 
amongst voters does not have the same effect in midterms as it might do in presidential 
elections. The party members and activists tend to vote, while turnout is low amongst the 
general electorate (Ware, 1981). The composition of the senate is never drastically affected as 
only one third of seats are contested in any cycle. In addition the continued rise of social 
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media use and engagement in campaigning and increasing levels of constant political 
reporting seems to have increased the vehemence of left and right in their particular 
entrenched positions.  
Nonetheless, Republican candidates and campaigners in Virginia, prior to the elections, 
argued that they were not witnessing such ‘anger’ and that they were ‘just not seeing’ any 
evidence of a potential backlash (Gabriel, 2017). Nor were they alone in their (as hindsight 
tells us) unexpected lack of foresight. Indications from pundits and analysts were also un-
predicting of huge changes in the makeup of the Virginia House. Some argued that if more 
than a single digit number of seats changed hands, this could indicate a direct response to the 
actions of President Trump. David Wasserman of the Cook Political Report echoed both the 
‘anti-Trump’ media narrative, and the traditional ‘White House Party loses seats’ 
conventional wisdom argument.  
Still, if Democrats managed to pick off 10 or more GOP-held seats, it would send a 
signal that voters are in the mood to punish President Trump and Republicans - a mirror 
image of the GOP legislative gains in 2009 that foreshadowed Republicans taking back 
the House in 2010 (2017) 
However, Wasserman, while talking down the possibility of the Democrats making 
significant gains in the Virginia House, also foretold potential implications of a more 
successful Democratic result, arguing that a with ‘pick up 10 to 15 seats, it would be a strong 
sign they're on track to pick up the House majority next year. If Democrats pick up more than 
15 seats, we're looking at a potential tidal wave in 2018.’  Interestingly enough, the Cook 
Report predictions of ‘likely’ and ‘toss-up’ Democratic gains were quite prophetic, but the 
‘Reaches ‘and ‘Tidal Wave’ predictions were more hit and miss, indicating that the resultant 
Democratic wins were unexpected in a number of specific Virginia locations.  
Nonetheless, with the Democratic Party contesting 88 out of 100 races, a level higher than in 
preceding years, clear signs of activism and activity were present, at least on the ground, if 
not obvious to the pre-election punditry. At the same time, The Center for Public Integrity 
stated that ‘Taken as a whole, however, the House of Delegates races show that Democrats 
are seriously behind in fundraising, and still have their work cut out for them.’ (Jordan 2017). 
Likewise, several Democratic fundraising 527 groups also saw limitations in any potential 
victory. The Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee (DLCC) thought eight seats were 
potential pickups, and Flippable saw only five instead, picking four of the same but one not 
identified by the DLCC. All but one of these combined nine seats did indeed result in 
Democratic victories. The singular exception, District 40, saw the Republican incumbent win 
with 50.17%, which was a 101 vote margin of victory, with just over 30,000 votes cast in 
total. 
Therefore, the idea that the Democrats could seriously challenge for control of the House, or 
start a tidal wave, was limited.  Furthermore, the 2017 off year election results in Virginia 
could be taken as indicative of arguments around the idea that what was witnessed was a 
reaction to the election and subsequent activity of Trump, or simply the usual ‘Anti White 
House incumbent’. Such a conclusion seems prima facia plausible. The State saw an 8-point 
victory for Democratic Gubernatorial candidate Ralph Northam with impressive results in the 
suburban north of the State as well as an increased turnout among the traditional Democratic 
base. This was despite earlier polls that indicated the race was neck and neck (and some that 
indicated that the Republican candidate had closed a previously existing gap). Allied to this 
were the highly unexpected (to put it mildly) results from the Virginia House of Delegates 
races themselves, where as we noted above, few expected the Democrats to capture such a 
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significant number of seats, let alone potentially challenge the existing Republican majority. 
However, we now consider the specific results, and examine the exit polling data, for specific 
insight into what conclusions can and should be drawn from Virginia in 2017. 
Governor and State-wide Results 
In a state that Hillary Clinton won in 2016, the Democrats had their hopes, although pre-
election polling was, as noted above, mixed at times.  Nonetheless, Northam (Dem) prevailed 
with 53.9% of the popular vote, or 1,405,041 votes, giving him a clear majority over his 
Republican opponent, Gillespie, who gained 45% of the vote.  A Libertarian candidate 
achieved 1.1% of the votes cast. In similar fashion, the Democrats swept the State-wide 
contests, winning both the Lt Governor race and that for Attorney General, with very similar 
results of 52.7% and 53.3% respectively.  
The Virginia Senate (comprising of 40 seats) was not in contest in 2017 (which seems lucky 
for the Republicans), but the 100 seat Virginia House of Delegates was. In a distinct, and 
given our discussion above, somewhat unexpected set of results, the Democratic Party picked 
up 15 seats from the Republicans, shifting the balance within the Chamber from a previous 
Republican dominated 66 to 34 seats to a much closer 49 to 51. This was the most dramatic 
shift toward the Democratic Party since the end of the 19th
 
Century.  However, it should be 
noted that 14 of the 15 seats where in districts that had Supported Hillary Clinton in the 2016 
Presidential election (Business Insider 2017). 
Furthermore, within this closest of margins overall result, there were four seats that were 
subject to closely watched and highly argued recount situations.  The most noted of these 
would be House District 94.  Here, initial results had the Republican, David Yancey with a 10 
vote lead, but the recount placed his Democratic opponent Shelly Simonds on a one vote 
lead.  It was not until 20 December that a panel of election judges ruled that one ballot, which 
had previously been disqualified, should be counted for Yancey.  This made the formal result 
of the election a tie, with both major party candidates receiving 11,608 votes (again, there 
was a Libertarian candidate in the race, who had 675 votes).  As per Virginia State Law, 
random chance now came into play.  In a ‘random drawing’ in early January 2018, Yancey 
(Rep) won, thereby keeping the House, by a majority of one, in Republican control. But for 
random chance, the overall result could have been even more spectacular.  
Nonetheless, such a singular event should not underplay the impressive victory achieved by 
the Democrats in their Virginia House races. While party and pundits alike had indicated that 
Democratic pick-ups were on the cards, none really considered the possibility they would be 
challenging for a significant gain, or even a tied chamber. So, exactly what was behind this 
impressive victory?  
An analysis of exit poll data, conducted by Edison media Research on behalf of the National 
Election Pool and the Washington Post among others, indicates a clear shift in behaviour 
amongst the Virginia electorate between the 2016 presidential election and the 2017 races. In 
terms of gender, while men made up a slight majority of voters, at 51% (the first time in 
recent Virginia voting history), they still supported the Republican candidate for Governor.  
However, while Trump gained the support of 52% (to 43% for Clinton) Gillespie (Rep) only 
gained 50% of the male vote, only two points ahead of Northam (Dem).  The telling 
difference in gender activity was in the shift in female support.  In 2016 Clinton gained 56% 
of female voters, with Trump gaining only 39%.  In 2017, Gillespie also received the support 
of 39% of female voters, but Northam support jumped to 61%, and women clearly gave the 
Democratic Party the edge in Virginia in 2017. In addition, some women voters clearly 
stayed at home, giving men the marginal turnout lead. 
 5 
 
In terms of age, we again see a clear and significant shift that indicates the foundation of 
these Virginia Democratic Party fortunes. Among older voters, where habits are predicted to 
be more embedded, the differences between 2016 and 2017 were limited.  With 65+ voters 
(who comprised roughly 20% of voters in Virginia in 2017) 53% supported Gillespie, almost 
equal to the 52% who supported Trump in 2016.  However, this 1% gain was offset by 
Northam gaining 47% of 65+ voters, to Clinton’s 45% in 2016. Likewise, in the 45-64 age 
category (roughly 42% of voters and thus a significant support group for any party) Northam 
gained the support of 49%, a 2% gain on 2016, while Gillespie only equalled Trumps 50% 
support. This indicates a small, but potentially significant shift. Nonetheless, it should but 
taken with precaution as older voters continued to favour the Republican Party, but, as we see 
below, in figures that are difficult to offset the more Democratic leaning younger voters. 
In the 30-44% age group, roughly 24% of Virginia voters, 53% had supported Clinton over 
40% for Trump in 2016. Here, in 2017, a clear shift occurred as 61% supported Northam over 
the 37% who favoured Gillespie.  This 8% shift indicates clear movement and offsets the 
potential Republican lead among older voters.  Furthermore, this is not the largest 
demographic shift between the two elections.  The 18-29 age group (the smallest group of 
voters, representing only 14% of voters in 2017) saw an even more dramatic shift of support 
to the Democratic Northam.  In 2016, Clinton had led Trump in this group with 54% to 36%, 
but Northam increased his share to 69%, while only 30% supported Gillespie.  It is clear, that 
even while representing a smaller proportion of the vote, there was a clear ‘youthquake’ in 
Virginia in November 2017. 
When the exit polling is considered by race, an even larger margin of support for the 
Democratic Party becomes evident among non-white voters.  As in previous races, White 
voters in Virginia tend to vote Republican. In 2016, 59% supported Trump, a 24 point 
advantage over Clinton’s 35%. In 2017, white voters made up 67% of voters in Virginia but 
Gillespie only led among them by 15 points, with 57% support. With Black voters, who made 
up one fifth of the electorate, supporting Northam at 87% to Gillespie’s 12%, clear divisions 
emerge.  However, Gillespie still managed to increase Republican support among this group 
by 3 points from Trump’s level of 9% in 2016.  
However, it is when an analysis by both gender and race is undertaken that the clear division 
between demographic group support, and a shift in that support, for the Republicans and 
Democrats emerges. With the Black vote broken down by gender, the slight support that 
Gillespie gained is still present – but clearly from Black men only. Black women support 
Northam at exactly the same level as Clinton in 2016. However, among White women 
Republican voting shifted from 54% in 2016 to only 51% in 2017 and Democratic support 
increased seven points to 48% in 2017.  Likewise, even while Democratic voting among 
White men remained low at 36% support, this was still an increase of seven points, while 
Gillespie managed 63%, a two percent decline from Trump’s 2016 support.  
Analysis over differing demographic groups is also available, and illustrates clear division 
and yet also highlights important changes. For instance, college educated individuals in 2017 
broke 60-39 for the Democrat, while in 2016 the breakdown was 55-39.  Likewise, White 
evangelical or White born-again Christians supported the Republican by 79% to 19% - but 
this group still witnessed a shift of 5 points towards the Democrats from the 2016 results. 
If, among these losses, there was a silver lining for Republicans in November 2017, it is that 
the damage was contained, albeit only somewhat contained, among their core groups. Their 
political position may be tenuous, but they had 12 month until the nationwide congressional 
midterm elections and a number of high-profile governor races to do something about it. It 
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clearly would not be easy, however. Clinton carried Virginia in 2016 and Republicans still 
won nationwide, but Northam's winning margins in the state were bigger. Moreover, when 
added to the wider picture and final outcomes that the Virginia House of Delegates painted, 
the trend-lines are heading in the wrong direction for the GOP.  
As Anthony Zurcher, BBC North American political correspondent observed, 
If the lesson that Trump takes from these results is that Republicans either embrace 
him or face defeat - then 2018 is going to be an even bigger referendum on Trump's 
presidency than 2017 was. That is a thought that will keep a lot of Republican office 
holders up at night. (Zurcher, 2017b) 
Nonetheless, without interrogating the exit poll data any further, clear conclusions can be 
drawn, and we cannot necessarily assume that we are witnessing an anti-Trump movement, 
or the traditional drop off in support for the incumbent party of the White House; these state-
wide demographic figures are seemingly slightly too big for that.  Also, when taken alongside 
the results of individual races for the Virginia House, the losses for the Republicans become 
much greater than these traditional approaches or explanations can potentially explain.  
Among specific groups, the Democratic candidate saw not only significant support, but 
support in higher terms than the Democratic presidential candidate in 2016. These groups 
clearly constitute the ‘Democratic Coalition’ that has emerged among voting groups within 
the US since the 1960s; women, minorities, and the young. This leaves us with the question 
of what exactly we witnessed in Virginia in 2017.  Was this clear ‘blue wave’ a new 
phenomenon driven by a new style of politics, a Trumpian era event? Or was it the 
emergence of an older Democratic theme? To consider this fully we need to move to the 
wider US picture. 
On 13 March 2018 Conor Lamb, a ‘moderate’ Democrat, won the PA18 congressional seat 
with a 20% swing to the Democrats, when compared to Trumps 2016 performance. In line 
with Virginia Donald Trump backed the GOP candidate and campaigned twice in the run-up 
to the poll for the GOP candidate. One commentator observed, 
There are more than a hundred Republican-held congressional districts across the 
country that have a narrower margin than 17(%). If seats that look like this one in 
Pennsylvania are toss-ups in November, it's going to be a bloodbath (Zurcher, 2018b). 
Moreover, and more worrying for the Republican Party, is the ‘enthusiasm gap.’ Lamb 
received 80% of the number of votes Clinton received in the district in 2016 — but Rick 
Saccone got just 53% percent of Trump’s vote  (Rakich, 2018). We need to be very careful 
here though; Democrat enthusiasm may not last and the midterm turnout is notoriously low 
(but then, so are special election turnouts). So while recent results may point to a Democratic 
revival, we will next consider the implications of recent GOP resignations and retirements 
from the House as another important and potential factor 
Republican Retirements- a rush to the exit? 
While election results are one measure of a potential ‘blue wave’, another is incumbents, or 
the lack thereof. Since fall 2017, a growing list of Republican state-wide office holders have 
announced that they will not seek re-election in 2018, in places giving the Democrats more 
competitive districts to fight. Examples include Rep. Frank LoBiondo, of New Jersey, who 
noted in a retirement statement, 
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As some of my closest colleagues have also come to realize, those of us who came to 
Congress to change Washington for the better through good governance are now the 
outliers … we previously fought against allowing the perfect to become the enemy of 
the good. Today, a vocal and obstinate minority within both parties has hijacked good 
legislation in pursuit of no legislation (cited in Cillizza, 2017) 
At the latest count, seven House Committee chairs have announced that they will not seek re-
election. The polarisation temperature of US politics has been raised before, but now the 
GOP has come to be visibly represented by 40 or so of its most conservative members. Such 
individuals are characterised by automatic opposition to any Democratic Party initiative and 
epitomised by Steve Bannon and his stated, ‘war against the traditional GOP’ agenda and 
also to any semblance of bipartisanship, such as that typified by Senator John McCain of 
Arizona. 
Perhaps the writing is already on the wall for several Republican members of Congress and 
that conceivably explains why the number of GOP members leaving congressional office in 
2018, or having already left in 2017, is running ahead of historic norms (Petulla, 2017). Two-
and-a-half times more Republicans are retiring than Democrats and, critically it is not just the 
regular numbers but also seven GOP House committee chairs who will vacate their seats. 
Many of those stepping down hail from districts that are either competitive or potentially 
competitive, especially in light of 2017 results, let alone events since. Hillary Clinton carried 
Ros-Lehtinen and Reichert's districts and while Trump carried LoBiondo's seat by four points 
that news looked better in early 2017 than in early 2018 (Petulla, 2017). Recent electoral 
history and conventional wisdom suggests that open seats are easier to win than those in 
which an incumbent is seeking re-election. With open seats, and a recent history of victory, 
such seats could easily become Democratic victories.  
Democrats need to pick up 24 seats to retake the majority from Republicans and are already 
eying 23 districts that Hillary Clinton carried and which will be defended by the GOP in 
November 2018. There are other Republican retirements occurring in congressional districts 
where Trump narrowly carried the vote, like New Jersey's 2nd or Michigan's
 
11th. Nor are 
such retirements unexpected, given these odds.  It may well be that the current incumbents 
can see which way the wind bloweth, as Petulla notes,  
Past research has found the emergence of "strategic retirement" by politicians when 
they think re-election is less likely. The recent results in Virginia and subsequent 
Republican departure suggest this phenomenon may be in effect (2017). 
Table 1 provides a list of representatives who have announced that they plan to leave office, 
broken down by resignation, retirement, or alternative employment/office-seeking. It should 
be noted that some members resigned before their terms ended. 
Retiring Republicans Retiring Democrats 
Sam Johnson TX-3 Niki Tsongas MA-3 
Jim Bridenstine OK-1 Carol Shea-Porter NH-1 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen FL-27 Gene Green TX-29 
Lynn Jenkins KS-2 Luis Gutierrez Il-4 
John J. Duncan Jr. TN-2 Sander Levin MI-9 
Dave Reichert WA-9 Ruben Kihuen NV-4 
Charlie Dent PA-15 Bob Brady PA-1 
Dave Trott MI-11 Rick Nolan MN-8 
Jeb Hensarling TX-5  
Lamar Smith TX-21  
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Frank LoBiondo NJ-2  
Ted Poe TX-2  
Bob Goodlatte VA-6  
Joe Barton TX-6  
Blake Farenthold TX-27  
Bill Shuster PA-9  
Greg Harper MS-3  
Ed Royce CA-39  
Darrell Issa  CA-49  
Pat Meehan PA-7  
Rodney Frelinghuysen NJ-11  
Trey Gowdy SC-4  
Tom Rooney Fl-17  
 
Republicans 
Resigned/ 
Resigning 
Comments Democrats 
Resigned/ 
Resigning 
Comments 
Jason Chaffetz 
UT-3 
Left to become a Fox News 
contributor. John Curtis (R) 
won special election 
Xavier Bacerra 
CA-34 
Left to become CA 
attorney General. Jimmy 
Gomez (D) won special 
election 
Tim Murphy 
PA-18 
Announced he would leave on 
10/21/17 following allegations 
about an extra-marital affair. 
Special election won by 
Democrat Conor Lamb. 
John Conyers 
MI-13 
Announced resignation 
after allegations of sexual 
harassment 
Pat Tiberi 
OH-12 
Announced on 10/19/17, will 
leave “by January 31, 2018.” 
Special election will be held 
on 7/8/18,  
  
Trent Franks 
AZ-8 
Announced resignation after 
allegations of sexual 
harassment. Special election 
on 24/4/18 
 
  
Republicans 
Running for 
another office 
Comments Democrats 
Running for 
another office 
Comments 
Kristi Noem 
SD-0 
Running for Governor John Delaney 
MD-6 
Running for President 
Raul Labrador 
ID-1 
Running for Governor Michelle Lujan 
Grisham NM-1 
Running for Governor 
James Renacci 
OH-16 
Running for Governor Jared Polis CO-
2 
Running for Governor 
Evan Jenkins 
WV-3 
Running for Senate Beto O'Rourke 
TX-16 
Running for Senate 
Lou Barletta  
PA-11 
Running for Senate Colleen 
Hanabusa HI-1 
Running for Governor 
Steve Pearce 
NM-2 
Running for Governor Jacky Rosen 
NV-3 
Running for Senate 
Diane Black 
TN-6 
Running for Governor Kyrsten Sinema 
AZ-9 
Running for Senate 
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Marsha 
Blackburn 
TN-7 
Running for Senate 
 
Tim Walz MN-1 Running for Governor 
Todd Rokita 
IN-4 
Running for Senate   
Luke Messer 
IN-6 
Running for Senate 
 
  
Ron De Santis 
FL-6 
Running for Governor   
Martha 
McSally AZ-2 
Running for Senate 
 
  
Table 1: House of Representatives Retirements Prior to 2018 Midterms (Petulla and Hansler, 2017) 
Prospects for the 2018 Midterms 
We will now consider the wider issues of historical voting patterns, recent Congressional 
results described above, and other factors that might project forward to November 2018. We 
start with the prospects for Democratic Party success in the House and Senate and consider 
what kind of candidates the Democratic is Party choosing to take the fight to Trump and the 
GOP. Part of what caused the 2016 ‘disaster’ at the national level was that states like Iowa, 
which had been reliably Democratic, went for Trump.  
We should point out that the Democratic primary in 2016 was a divisive contest with Bernie 
Sanders emerging as a creditable alternative during what many saw as the coronation of 
Hillary Clinton. The later allegation covering Clinton control of the DNC (Wilts, 2017) 
surprised few. The fact is that Clinton in 2016 was an unpopular choice for the Democratic 
Party nomination, even with the traditional Democratic base. Her performance failed to 
enthuse the electorate and her ‘flyover’ campaign arguably cost the states of Pennsylvania 
and Michigan.    
Iowa, twice carried by Barack Obama, had a 15.9% swing to the right from 2012 - the largest 
in the nation. If Democrats want to find a path to victory in 2020, testing out possible 
messages, policies and candidates in Iowa in 2018 could be valuable (Zurcher, 2017a). Bernie 
Sanders has travelled widely in recent weeks. He, and his supporters, have,  
attempted to harness the energy and enthusiasm generated by his presidential 
campaign into a durable political movement, Our Revolution… (and) is organising on 
a grass-roots level across the US and supporting local, state and national candidates in 
the 2018 mid-terms and beyond (Zurcher, 2018a) 
Is the Democratic path to victory in 2018 on the back of such a movement? Perhaps the 
Goldwater campaign in 1962-4 provides a lesson? It’s early to judge, but in Texas 17 ‘Our 
Revolution’ supported candidates were successful in the Democratic primaries.  
In Pennsylvania, the 18
th
 district was fought and won by Conor Lamb, a moderate who does 
not take a liberal stance on gun control. In heavily Republican areas is selecting this type of 
Democrat the smart choice for the party? Interesting Lamb was selected, not through the 
traditional primary route, but through selection by the local party; a potentially contentious, if 
electorally successful strategy.  
A recent Brookings Institution report showed that not only are there more Democrats in the 
field than is historically usual at this point in the cycle, but they have also raised more 
campaign funds than before. Crucially, these candidates are fighting the most contested 
 10 
 
districts, where the GOP have had resignations and where the poll numbers indicate potential 
gains (Malbin (2018).    
President Trump’s approval rating has been around 37-40% for most of the last 6 months and 
while we have shown the importance of incumbency for mid-term elections, perhaps a better 
analysis can be derived from the polls. The latest generic congressional ballot shows the 
Democrats leading 45.7 – 37.8 a lead of 7.9 points, using the Real Clear Politics average 
(RealClearPolitics, 2018). While this average was early in the cycle, and the power of 
incumbency is noted, we are prepared to predict on our analysis and with the support of such 
data that the Democrats will take the House of Representatives on 6 November 2018. 
Also, of clear significance to Democrats are the potential of the 2018 Senate races. Assuming 
Senate Independents continue to caucus with the Democratic Party, a swing of two seats is 
required. Of the 34 contests expected in 2018, thirteen (CA, CT, DE, HI, MA, MD, MN, NJ, 
NM, NY, RI, VT and WA) are considered to be safe Democratic seats. A further nine seats 
(FL, ME, MI, MN, OH, PA, VA, MT and WI) are likely Democratic or leaning that way. The 
GOP is thought to be safe in five seats, (MS (2), NE, UT, and WY). In two states which 
would normally be certainties for the GOP, Jeff Flake has left a messy legacy in Arizona, 
while he contemplates a challenge to Trump, and Ted Cruz is under pressure in Texas.   
Table 2 shows the swing states and key battlegrounds, with our predictions added. While it is 
almost impossible to predict the subsequent Senate make up at this stage - it may even go to 
contested run offs in some states – we come down on a Democratic Party (including two 
independents) majority 51–49.  
State Comments Prediction 
Arizona A seat vacated by Trump nemesis Jeff Flake should be 
interesting as the GOP fight a potentially messy primary until 
August. The state is moving to the left and Trump’s win in 
2016 may not be enough to halt the impressive Krysten Sinema 
Dem. gain 
Florida The Democrats fear Gov. Rick Scott may be the GOP 
candidate. But if he doesn’t run, most commentators expect 
incumbent Bill Nelson to be re-elected 
Dem.  hold 
 
Indiana Low profile incumbent Donnelly may benefit from a hotly 
contested GOP primary. But Trump won by double digits in 
2016 and Donnelly has bad press from links to business in 
Mexico – perhaps our weakest prediction but... 
Dem.  hold 
 
Minnesota Tina Smith replaced Al Franken in January and with Tim 
Pawlenty likely to run for Governor, she should be safe. 
Minnesota has three state-wide elections this year so worth 
keeping an eye on turnout 
Dem.  hold 
 
Missouri The GOP seem to behind Hawley, but will it last? Claire 
McCaskill is at risk in a state Trump won by 19% but she is 
campaigning vigorously 
Dem. hold 
Montana Although Trump won the state by 21%, incumbent John Tester 
is a popular senator and farmer. He may be helped by a GOP 
dogfight in the primary 
Dem.  hold 
 
Nevada Incumbent Heller faced a primary challenge, although Trump 
was successful in persuading a putative challenger to run for 
the House. This will be used against the GOP candidate. If 
Democrats pick the right candidate in a state Clinton won by 4 
points, they can take advantage of GOP flips on Obamacare 
Dem. gain 
North Dakota Incumbent Heidi Heitkamp defends for the Democrats in a 
state Trump won by 36%. In any other time a clear GOP gain, 
Dem. hold 
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but Heitkamp has a strong brand and, despite Trump’s efforts, 
the party has yet to unite behind Kevin Cramer 
Ohio Likely to be in play, only if the GOP re-nominate Josh Mandel. 
Mandel picked Marco Rubio over Ohio favourite son, Kasich, 
so we expect a primary fight 
Dem hold 
Texas Polls show the race tightening but O’Rourke has a lot to do to 
unseat Cruz 
GOP hold 
West Virginia Incumbent Joe Manchin has survived a strong swing to the left 
but is under pressure over links to Mylan. Trump won with 
69% of the vote so a potential game changer 
GOP gain 
Table 2 – 2018 Senate Battleground.(Burlij and Bradner, 2018) (Robillard2017) 
  
 
 
What chance a Democrat in 2020?  
Alec Baldwin the actor, who is probably most famous for his impersonation of Donald 
Trump on Saturday Night Live, recently spoke to roughly 3,000 Democratic officeholders 
and activists gathered in a Des Moines convention hall for the state party's annual Fall Gala. 
Amongst the jokes, Baldwin said that the Democratic Party had become riddled with 
complacency and riven by disunity. He warned that leftover animosity from the 2016 
presidential primary between Hillary Clinton and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders needs to 
be put aside. "Both were infinitely better suited for office than Donald Trump," he noted. 
(Zurcher, 2017a) 
It's still over two and a half years from the next US presidential election; the Democratic 
presidential field won’t even begin to take shape until well after the midterms in November. 
Big names, like Sanders, former Vice-President Joe Biden and a raft of Democratic senators 
including Cory Booker of New Jersey, Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, Kamala Harris of 
California and Chris Murphy of Connecticut, have sidestepped Iowa for the time being. At 
this stage we contend that  the Democratic field for president will be as crowded in 2020 as it 
was in 2008 and may bear comparison to the Republican primary in 2015-16. Such an 
occurrence could be a boon for either party, given the febrile nature of contemporary US 
politics. Such a crowded field worked for Trump in his drive for the nomination, but the 
Democrats play by a very different rulebook (Bradshaw, 2016). 
At the time of writing, the only candidate officially in the race is Maryland Congressman 
John Delaney. The businessman-turned-politician, who announced in July 2027, has already 
visited Iowa five times and is more moderate than Sanders and his fellow progressives. Jeff 
Flake, most recently the GOP Senator from Arizona, has indicated that he may challenge 
Trump in 2020. While Flake may be itching for a fight, surely the Democratic Party lessons 
from 1968 and 1980 (Bradshaw, 2016) will lead to the GOP elite attempting to block this 
move.  
While Trump is historically unpopular - at 40% approval in a recent Gallop poll (Gallop, 
2018) the Democrats are far from unified. As Helmut Norpoth, a political science professor at 
Stony Brook University in New York, noted: 
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I think Democrats don't realise what kind of a special candidate they had in Barack 
Obama …They had Bill Clinton, they had Obama, but these guys don't come around 
every year. I don't know who, at this point, would have that kind of appeal (Amos, 
2017) 
In a sense this echoes the Party’s search for the ‘new JFK’ through the Republican 
domination of the White House between 1968 and 1992. But at the same time, whoever steps 
up to the plate will be inheriting a different electoral stage to that which led up to 2016. Most 
notably the candidate will need to appeal to the, possible shifting, Democratic base in the 
primary, while bearing in mind the traditional track to the right required in the general 
election. Democratic Party unity is a fickle thing and we make no prediction here as to the 
outcome of the 2020 primary; we merely emphasise that defeating the GOP at the highest 
level requires the nominee, the DNC and the grassroots to work together in a way that was 
not apparent in 2016.  
Conclusion 
Our analysis has reflected on the rise of the Democratic Party’s electoral fortunes since 
November 2017 and placed this in recent historical context. We have shown how this, and the 
raft of Republican resignations from Congress, may lead to Democratic control of the 
legislature and how that may provide a springboard to the 2020 presidential campaign. We 
note the risk of making predictions at this, or any, stage in the current US political climate 
and therefore our paper is limited by the shifting sands that preclude accurate projections. In 
other words, regular updates would be required to enhance the meaning and reliability of 
what we have written here. Therefore, it is the intention that this paper will be the first in a 
series of such works which will track the fortunes of the rise of the Democratic Party’s liberal 
left, or indeed, the (re)establishment of the traditional Democratic coalition. 
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